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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NICKERSON PUMP AND 
MACHINERY CO., INC., 
Petition.er, 
-vs.-
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9353 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties herein will be designated as follows: Pe-
titioner, Nickerson Pump and J.\!Iachinery Co., Inc., as 
''Nickerson'' and Respondent, State Tax Commission of 
Utah, as the ''Tax Commission.'' Emphasis has been 
supplied. 
This is a proceeding to review an order and decision 
of the Tax Commission imposing a sales tax liability and 
deficiency upon Nickerson. The assessment was based 
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upon a series of transactions wherein the petitioner sold 
and emplaced water pumps to governmental units under 
lump-sum contracts, the governmental units being exempt 
from sales tax liability. The issue presented, as suggest-
ed by the petitioner, is whether plaintiff is the consumer 
of water pump assemblies sold and emplaced by it under 
lump-sum contracts, it apparently being conceded that if 
Nickerson is found to be the consumer of the pump assem-
blies in question it is subject to sales or use tax as assessed 
by the State Tax Commission. 
It is submitted that to find Nickerson a consumer 
does not require modification of previous decisions as 
intimated by petitioner, but rather that previous decisions 
relied upon by the petitioner have already been severely 
qustioned by this Court. It is stipulated and conceded 
that the penalties mentioned in petitioner's Point II were 
improperly assessed and that its Point III is valid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees substantially with the statement 
of facts as set forth by the petitioner. In addition thereto, 
the following facts are submitted: 
The pumps in question are specifically engineered 
for the particular need involved. An engineering firm is 
often consulted to determine the requirement of the water 
and the size of the pump which is needed in a particular 
case, and a complete set of specifications are furnished to 
the petitioner, which then supplies a pump and related 
equipment for the given need. (T. R. pg. 79) 
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The following items are included in the lump-sum 
contract, and petitioner is required to furnish: 
1. a motor and pump head 
2. a discharge column assembly 
3. a suction pipe and strainer 
4. a water level indicator 
5. labor 
(Commission's Exhibit 16 and 17.) These exhibits are 
typical of what is bid upon by petitioner, in that they 
list the specifications, the type of equipment and the basis 
for payment which go into a lump-sum bid of the nature 
involved herein. ( T. R. p. 73) 
In addition, the Tax Commission found the in-
stallation of deep well pumps under lump-sum contracts 
made by the taxpayer with tax-exempt organizations on 
property of said organizations to be an installation by 
an ultimate consumer of materials and supplies for the 
purpose of erecting, building on or otherwise improving, 
altering or repairing the real property of others. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PETITIONER, NICKERSON PUMP AND MA-
CHINERY CO., IS A CONSUMER. 
The question is fundamentally as stated by the peti-
tioner on page 13 of its brief. If the petitioner in the 
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sale and emplacement of pumps and pumping equipment 
under a lump-sum contract is the consumer, it should pay 
the tax on materials being consumed. In other words, the 
question is whether or not petitioner consumes the pump, 
motor and related equipment necessary to fill its lump-
sum contract and to deliver an operating unit installed 
in the ground. In this regard there can be no question 
but that Nickerson is a consumer. 
The petitioner contends that assembling pumps from 
component parts is "manufacturing" or "compounding 
for sale,'' and, further contends that manufacturing is 
not taxable as consumption. Error is committed here. 
Section 59-16-4 (h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, does not 
exempt property consumed by a manufacturer as the last 
user. See Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Com-
mission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P. 2d 164 (1946). Therefore, 
even if Nickerson were a manufacturer, only the property 
which entered into and became an ingredient or compo-
nent part of the property manufactured which was thus 
passed on to an ultintate user would be thereby exempt. 
The test is, ''Are the articles involved consumed by the 
processor as the last user~ If they are so consumed the 
tax must be paid thereon by the processor." E. C. Olsen 
Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 P. 2d 
324 (1946). 
Petitioner claims it is exempt from the tax in ques-
tion because it manufactures or compounds for sale, but 
the test for the manufacturing exemption is whether or 
not the articles involved are consumed. Hence, petitioner 
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begs the question by claiming the manufacturing 
exemption. 
Petitioner further contends that under the terms of 
Tax Commission Regulation 58, where the contractor en-
ters into both lump-sum contracts and agreements to fur-
nish materials and supplies at a fixed price and to render 
~l'l'\'ire for an additional price that he is deemed to be 
a retailer of tangible personal property and that the 
Commission should be bound by this determination. The 
Regulation provides that : 
"In case a contractor enters into both of the 
above kinds of contracts, he shall be deemed to be 
a retailer of tangible personal property and shall 
register with the State Tax Commission, obtain a 
sales tax license, purchase all materials for resale 
;and report his liability direct to the State Tax 
Commission.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
Petitioner suggests that this has been done and, therefore, 
that it is a retailer of tangible personal property. It is 
significant that Regulation 58 further provides: 
"Contra.ctors or repairmen in, no case should give 
a resale certificate when they purchase materials, 
supplies, equipment or other a.rticles for their own 
use and consumption." 
The plain import of Regulation 58 is to require con-
tractors entering into both of the above kinds of contracts 
to obtain a sales tax license in order to properly collect 
tax and report their liability and pay sales tax on retail 
sales. The quoted parts of Regulation 58 are in no way 
designed to abrogate the lump-sum provisions of the 
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Regulation concerning contracts by contractors wherein 
the sale of materials and supplies is taxable to the con-
tractor where he becomes the consumer or the final buyer. 
Taxpayer, in the present case, contends that it does 
not consume pumps ; that the buyers from it do con-
sume them, and that the pump assemblies retain their 
identity after being installed under a lump-sum contract. 
The Tax Commission respectfully takes issue with these 
contentions. In particular Nickerson Pump and Machin-
ery Co. did act as a consumer of purchases specified in 
Schedules 2 and 4 of the original deficiency assessment. 
Petitioner claims not to be a consumer, user or storer of 
the purchases involved and bases this claim upon a strict 
definition of the word "consumed." However, this as 
defined in the case of Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. 
State Taa; Commission, 101 Ut. 513, 125 P. 2d 408 (1942), 
has been given a liberal construction. The court in that 
case said: 
"From the context of our statute 'used' and 'con-
sumed' may be said to express the same meaning 
- to make use of, to employ and does not neces-
sarily mean the immediate destruction or extermi-
nation or change in form of the article or com-
modity." 
It is not disputed that the transactions which resulted in 
an assessment by the State Tax Commission were those 
upon which the taxpayer bid and sold pumps, motors and 
related equipment under lump-sum contracts. 
"Sales to contractors are sales to consumers * * * " 
State v. J. WaUs Kearn.ey & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 78 
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(1934). See also Volk v. Evatt, 142 Ohio 335, 52 N.E. 2d 
338 (1943). 
''A contractor when fabricating personalty into 
realty neither sells, resells, sells at retail, nor can he be 
considered a retailer.'' Duha;me v. State Ta.x Commission., 
65 Ariz. 268, 179 P. 2d 252, 171 ALR 684 (1947). 
According to the Utah Supreme Court the words 
''used'' and ''consumed'' are synonymous. To construe 
either word to mean that the state may only tax the sale 
of property which is consumed or destroyed in use is to 
virtually annihilate the Act and give it a strained and 
unthought of meaning. Such a construction would imme-
diately exclude diamond rings, luxuries and other things 
not destroyed or consumed immediately in use, from the 
realm of liability for sales and use taxes. It is suggested 
that this intention cannot be attributed to the legislature. 
However, even under the narrow definition as contended 
by taxpayer, the personal property used by the contractor 
was consumed and used under lump-sum contracts. 
In addition to defining ''consume'' to mean ''to de-
stroy," "to use up" and "to expend," Webster's New 
International Dictionary gives the following definitions: 
''Consumer n. 1. One that consumes. 2. Eco-
nomics. One who uses (economic) goods and so 
diminishes or destroys their utility; opposed to 
producer.'' 
''Consumption * * * 2. Economics. The use of 
(economic) goods resulting in the diminution or 
destruction of their utility; - opposed to produc-
tion. Consumption may consist in the active use 
of goods in such a manner as to accomplish their 
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direct and immediate destruction, as in eating food, 
wearing clothes, or burning fuel; or it may consist 
in the mere keeping, and enjoying the presence or 
prospect of, a thing, which is destroyed only by 
the gradual processes of natural decay, as in the 
maintenance of a picture gallery.'' 
''Generally, it may be said that consumption means 
using things, and production means adapting them for 
use." See J. W. Meadors & Co. v. State, 89 Ga. App. 583, 
80 S.E. 2d 86 (1954). 
The problem of what is meant by "consume" was 
presented to the Colorado Supreme Court under a statute 
providing that a ''retail sale'' includes all sales made 
within the state except wholesale sales, and that ''whole-
sale sale'' means a sale by wholesalers to retail merchants, 
jobbers, dealers, or other wholesalers for resale and does 
not include a sale to "users or consumers, not for resale." 
It was held, in Craftsmen Painters & Decorators v. Car-
pen>ter, 111 Colo. 1, 137 P. 2d 414 (1942), that an ad-
ministrative regulation in effect declaring that building 
contractors were users or consumers of materials and 
supplies used by them in performing building contracts 
was valid. And it was held that painting contractors were 
the users of paints, oils, finishes, and other incidental 
materials used by them in the business of painting con-
tractors, and that electrical contractors were the users 
and consumers of wire, lighting :fixtures, and incidental 
materials used in the business of electrical contracting. 
The court said : 
"The problem presented to the director of rev-
enue, briefly stated, was, Were plaintiffs the ulti-
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mate users and consumers of the materials built 
into their jobs and furnished the owner as an en-
tirety, or were they retailers to those owners ?f 
each particular item of personal property so bu1lt 
in'? Stated otherwise, Were they selling to the 
owner the completed job, or were they selling him 
separately each pint of paint and each piece of 
wire used in the job~ We think his conclusion that 
when they purchased the several items of personal 
property and built them into the structure as an 
integral part of their entire contract, and then dis-
posed of the completed work to the owner, they 
were users and consumers and not retailers to the 
owner of each item, was not only a ruling within 
his discretion, but is absolutely irrefutable on any 
basis of logical reasoning, and that authority to 
support it is no more essential than is authority to 
support the conclusion that black is not white, or 
that two plus two equals four." See Note 163 
A.L.R. p. 282. 
It is urged that Nickerson can be nothing but a con-
sumer under applicable statutes and judicial interpre-
tations. 
Petitioner further contends that the pumps, motors 
and related equipment which are the subject matter of this 
deficiency assessment are no less pumps and related 
equipment after emplacement than before, and con-
tends that because of this fact petitioner is not a con-
sumer. It becomes necessary to determine what is meant 
by a product losing its identity or being incorporated into 
a separate entity. In the Utah Concrete Products case, 
Supra, the Utah Supreme Court cites approvingly the 
case of City of St. Louis v. Smith, 342 Mo. 317, 114 S.W. 
~d 1017 (1938), where under Retail Sales Statutes the 
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contractors in question were held liable for the tax as 
''consumers'' and it was found to be the dealer's duty to 
collect the tax at the time of sale. The court there said: 
"It is clear from these statutory provisions that 
where one buys tangible personal property for his 
own use or consumption he is liable for the tax. 
On the other hand, it is equally clear that where 
one buys tangible personal property for the pur-
pose of resale he is not liable for the tax. In this 
case, the contractors agreed with the city to fur-
nish all the labor and material neceessary to con-
struct, and to construct the improvement in ques-
tion for a fixed sum of money. It was necessary 
for the contractor to purchase and use all material 
necessary to complete said work in order to be in 
a position to deliver to the city a completed struc-
ture a.s provided in the contract. Our judgment is 
that it cannot be said by the contractor that he re-
sold the materials to the city for its use, and then 
not use or consume them in the performance of his 
contract. We are not without authority on this 
question. In the case of State v. Christhilf, 170 Md. 
586, 185 Atl. 456, 458 (1936), that court said: 'It is 
the contractor or builder who is the ultimate user 
or consumer of the materials which in one of these 
cases are converted and fabricated into a building 
and in the other into a road.' 
''Another authority, State v. J. Watts Kearney & 
Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1954), is to the same 
effect. Speaking of sales of materials to con-
tractors, that court said : 'His undertaking is to 
deliver to his obligee some work or edifice or 
structure, the construction of which requires the 
application of skill and labor to these materials 
so that, when he finishes his task, the materials 
purchased are no longer to be distinguished but 
something has been wrought from their use and 
10 
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union. The contractor has not resold, but has 
consumed the materials. Sales to contractors are 
sales to consumers.' 
"Again, the case of York Heating & Ventilating 
Co. v. Flannary, 87 Pa. Suer. 19 (1936), that court 
said of the installation of a blower and heating 
system by contract: 'The contract in suit in no 
sense was a contract of sale. It was a construction 
contract. * * * It would be just as proper to call 
a contract for the construction of a building, a 
sale of the stone, brick, cement, wood, etc., which 
entered into the erection of the building' 
"In our judgment the contractors in this case did 
not buy the materials in question, for the purpose 
of reselling such materials to the city. They were 
under contract to deliver to the city the finished 
product. It was the in-separable comingling of 
labor and material that produced the finished 
product. Our conclusion is that the contractors 
used and consumed the material in order to pro-
duce the finished product in compliance with their 
contract." (Emphasis supplied) 
In the case of .Atlas Supply Co. v. Maxwell, 212 N.C. 
624, 194 S.E. 117 (1957), the court on holding plumbing 
and heating contractors subject to sales tax law stated 
that: 
''They purchase the materials and supplies, not 
for resale as tangible personal property, but for 
use in producing the turnkey job. There is no 
resale of the materials and supplies as such, either 
actual or intended, within the meaning of the act." 
See views expressed to the same effect in Lone Star C e-
ment Co. v. State Tax Commission, 234 Ala. 465, 175 So. 
399 (1937) ; .Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Bureau of Rev-
11 
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enue, 42 N.M. 58, 75 P. 2d 334 (1938) ; Sta.te v. J. Watts 
Kearny & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1934); Herlihy 
Mid-ConUnent Co. v. Nudelma;n., 367 TIL 60, 12 N.E. 2d 
638, 115 A.L.R. 491 (1938). All of which cases were cited 
in the Utah Concrete Products case at page 519. 
It is submitted that an article of tangible personal 
property sold under a lump-sum construction contract to 
install the same thereby loses its identity in that what is 
finally sold is not personal property but is rather that 
article plus any other articles combined with the labor 
necessary to meet specifications under the lump-sum con-
tract. This was considered in the case of Harding v. Okla-
homa Tax Commission, 275 P. 2d 264 (1954), where it was 
held that the taxpayer did not sell a specific amount of 
cement, tile, lumber, etc., but rather he contracted to and 
did construct an airplane hangar, and if there was any 
contract of sale at all it was for the sale of a completed 
hangar and not for the various component parts thereof. 
It is apparent that petitioner in this case is a con-
sumer because it was the last person to deal with the 
products which it sold before they lost their identity as 
such and became incorporated into a separate entity. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioner did act as a consumer of articles in 
filling its lump-sum contracts with various governmental 
units. 
12 
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The decision of the Tax Commission should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General 
F. BURTON HOWARD, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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